A growing theoretical and empirical literature shows that public recognition can lead employees to exert greater effort. However, status competition is also associated with excessive expenditure on status goods, greater likelihood of bankruptcy, and more risk taking by money managers. This paper examines the effects of recognition and status competition jointly. In particular, we focus on the spillover effects of public recognition on the performance and risk taking of peers. Using newly collected data on monthly "victory" scores of more than 5,000 German pilots during World War II, we find that status competition had important effects: After the German armed forces bulletin mentioned the accomplishments of a particular fighter pilot, his former peers performed considerably better. This outperformance varied across skill groups. When a former squadron peer was mentioned, the best pilots tried harder, scored more, and died no more frequently; in contrast, average pilots won only a few additional victories but died at a significantly higher rate. Hence our results show that the overall efficiency effect of nonfinancial rewards can be ambiguous in settings where both risk and output affect aggregate performance. * Corresponding author (voth@econ.uzh.ch). For helpful comments we thank Ran Abramitzky, Karol
I. INTRODUCTION
Humans crave recognition. In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith defined "bettering our condition" as "to be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy … and approbation." From baseball's Hall of Fame to the Congressional Medal of Honor, from the fellowships of scholarly societies to the employee-of-the-month award, symbolic rewards exploit the human need for approbation as a motivating force. By creating an artificial scarcity, awards are meant to spur effort and increase output (Bénabou and Tirole 2003, 2006; Frey 2007; Moldovanu et al. 2007; Besley and Ghatak 2008) .
1 Empirical evidence from the field and from experimental settings suggests that nonpecuniary rewards generally lead to reduced absenteeism, greater effort, and higher accuracy (Markham et al. 2002; Kosfeld and Neckermann 2011; Ashraf et al. 2014a; Chan et al. 2014 ).
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At the same time, "[a] medal glitters, but it also casts a shadow" (Winston Churchill).
3 Competing for awards and recognition is similar to other forms of status competition, from conspicuous consumption to prominent donations (Veblen 1973; Glazer and Konrad 1996; Frank 2010; Layard 2005) . A recent literature has shown that relative status concerns are real and can have negative effects. The neighbors of lottery winners spend much more on cars (Kuhn et al. 2011 ) and face substantially higher risks of bankruptcy (Agarwal et al. 2016) . 4 Consumers of financial services demand the same products purchased by their peers because of social learning and because consumers are affected by the utility of what others have (Bursztyn et al. 2014) . Similar effects also obtain in the workplace. Card et al. (2012) and Ashraf et al. (2014b) show that job satisfaction and performance suffer from direct rankings and explicit comparisons with others in the same group. 5 The net effect of competing for relative standing and symbolic awards may be ambiguous: the result may be to "crowd in" effort, giving rise to social multiplier effects; alternatively, competition effects may crowd out effort as a function of relative rank or innate skill (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Dohmen 2008; Ariely et al 2009; Apesteguia and PalaciosHuerta 2010; Gonzalez-Dias and Palacios-Huerta 2016) .
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In this paper we look at the joint effects of recognition and status competition. The focus is on the spillover effects of public recognition on the performance and risk taking of peers. We use new monthly data on victory claims for all German pilots with at least one such claim in World War II -a data set that includes the highestscoring aces of all time. Aerial combat is an ideal setting for analyzing the incentive effects of public recognition: the stakes are high, effort is extremely difficult to observe, and principal-agent problems are rife. In a single-seater fighter plane, the pilot operates alone; and once a battle is joined, there is no effective control of individual planes by superior officers. Each pilot was responsible for deciding whether to pursue victory or break off contact. Pilots could try to boost their score by flying more days a week, flying additional sorties per day, and taking extra risks during missions.
Although it cannot be known ex ante whether status competition will sharpen or instead dull incentives there is ample anecdotal evidence that such competition was a strong motivating force. During the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940, for example, two German aces -Adolf Galland and Werner Mölders -were neck and neck in terms of total victories (Galland 1993) . When Mölders was ordered to confer with the head of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Göring, he went to Berlin for three days of meetings but only on the condition that Galland be grounded for the same number of days. Remarkably, at a time when the air battle against Britain hung in the balance, Göring (himself a WWI fighter ace) accepted that one of his best pilots would be grounded for no militarily justifiable reason.
We combine data on social distance in pre-existing networks with data on the timing of awards to demonstrate that public recognition systematically crowded in effort. Fellow pilots tried harder after another fighter pilot received public recognition, significantly increasing their score of aerial victories during the month in question. This effect was especially pronounced for the best pilots, among whom competition was intense, and for those who were closest (in terms of social distance) to the pilot receiving recognition. To examine the effects of such public recognition, we focus on mentions by name in the German armed forces daily bulletin (Wehrmachtbericht). 7 We take this approach for several reasons: First, mentions were rare and were reserved for recognizing spectacular accomplishments (e.g., a very high number of enemy ships sunk, tanks destroyed, or fighters shot down, either cumulatively or over a period of time). Second, mentions became known instantly over a wide area since they were broadcast on the radio, published in the press, and distributed at command posts throughout German territory. Third, mentions in the daily bulletin were largely unexpected; there was no straightforward rule that "entitled" a pilot to (1987) and Cohn et al. (2014) find that such comparisons reduce effort. Competing against a superstar (e.g., Tiger Woods in a golf tournament) may likewise reduce effort (Brown 2011) . 7 We draw on Wegmann (1982) , an edited compendium of all Wehrmachtbericht issues.
being mentioned. Fourth, mentions in the Wehrmachtbericht were a fleeting form of recognition -providing the recipient with nothing more tangible than a short-term elevation of status in the eyes of others. For all these reasons, we consider those mentions in the daily bulletin to be a useful source for identifying variation as we analyze the effects of status competition.
The top panel of Figure 1 shows the average victory score for aces and non-aces when a former peer (from the same squadron) is mentioned in the daily armed forces bulletin. We exclude peers still serving in the same squadron in order to avoid contamination from correlated shocks. Aces always scored more, but they increased their monthly victory rate by 1.1 victories (over the base level of 1.9) when a fellow pilot was mentioned in the bulletin. In addition, non-aces scored 0.12 victories more than their baseline of 0.23.
[insert Figure 1 about here]
Pilots who are no longer serving in the same unit are unlikely be exposed to correlated shocks. The results hold when we impose a "minimum distance" requirement between the two units. We interpret these effects as being driven by competition for status in the spirit of "keeping up with the Joneses". Moreover, we provide evidence ruling out a variety of alternative interpretations: learning about one's own type, common shocks to peers, joint learning of particular skills in the past, and differences in equipment available to pilots.
As the monthly rate of aerial victories by peers increased, so did the casualty rate. This raises the question of whether social multiplier effects may have compromised the Luftwaffe's overall fighting efficiency. The best pilots reacted to awards bestowed on competitors by increasing their own performance, and their exit rate actually declined (a little). 8 Yet even though average pilots also tried harder, they paid a high price in the form of much greater casualty rates (Panel B, Figure 1 ). We are not in a position to assess how the "mentions" system affected efficiency overall, but there are some reasons to believe that it may have reduced the German air force's effectiveness.
Our work relates to the literatures on tournaments and peer effects. There are strong theoretical grounds for believing that -in a single-shot setting -tournaments can induce greater effort from participants (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Green and Stokey 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglitz 1983a, 1983b) . However, many tournaments are dynamic in nature. Scholars have increasingly examined the effects of information release in such a setting (Lizzeri et al. 2002; Yildirim 2005; Aoyagi 2007; Ederer 2010; Goltsman and Mukherjee 2011) . Genakos and Pagliero (2012) show how risk taking in professional weightlifting competitions follows an inverted-U curve as a function of relative standing. Fershtman and Gneezy (2011) similarly find that increasing the stakes of a tournament can lead to more effort yet also to quitting by lower-ranked competitors. 9 Our own results indicate that status concerns can indeed promote risk taking, and we demonstrate this dynamic in a setting with high stakes (and no tangible upside, financially). Far from pilots "giving up", though, we find additional effort exerted and greater risks taken -with deadly consequences.
The rich literature on peer effects studies how collaborating with others affects worker effort and performance (Falk and Ichino 2006; Mas and Moretti 2009; Bandiera et al. 2010) . Peer effects are typically driven by knowledge spillovers, task complementarities, or social pressure. In our setting, the first two of these drivers can essentially be ruled out. It is worth remarking also that evidence for peer pressure is relatively strong for low-skilled individuals but is distinctly mixed among the highly skilled (Jackson and Bruegmann 2009; Azoulay et al. 2010; Waldinger 2012) . In this paper we offer an example of social interactions creating greater incentives to perform among highly skilled (and motivated) individuals.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the determinants of military performance. Classic studies in military history have emphasized the importance of collaborative efforts (Stouffer et al. 1949; McPherson 1997; Van Creveld 2007) . Along these lines, unit cohesion has been shown to be higher when soldiers are from similar backgrounds. For instance, Costa and Kahn (2003) document lower rates of desertion from units with low occupational and birthplace fragmentation; these authors also report that survival rates in a prisoner-of-war camp were much higher for prisoners embedded in richer social networks (Costa and Kahn 2007) . In contrast to the literature emphasizing the importance of joint production and unit cohesion in military units, we emphasize the importance of individual incentives and of competition.
Our results are of general interest despite the highly specific nature of this study. We present novel evidence that the effects of symbolic rewards depend on social context. Status competition can lead to a crowding in of effort. At the same time, highpowered incentives -in the form of public recognition -may backfire precisely because concerns about status can induce too much risk taking. A clear analogy is the performance incentive in the compensation that a financial institution pays to its traders; in that case, the desire to be the "best" trader can lead to catastrophic losses.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background on the German air force during World War II and on the data we use. In Section III we present the main findings, and Section IV discusses alternative channels and interpretations. We conclude in Section V.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND DATA
In this section we describe our study's setting: the organization of the German air force in World War II; and its rise and fall as a fighting force. We also discuss the sources and limitations of our data.
A. German air force during World War II
Aerial combat began during World War I. Initially, planes were unarmed. They quickly evolved into specialized types, ranging from single-seat fighters to bombers. During that war, the highest-scoring ace -the "Red Baron" Manfred von Richthofen -notched 80 victories (Castan 2007) . By the time World War II began, both fighters and bombers had become faster and more powerful. The German air force had sent planes and men to participate in the Spanish Civil War (on Franco's side), gaining valuable experience. There, the Luftwaffe carried out the first mass bombing of a civilian target at Guernica in 1936. German air support was crucial for the ultimate victory of the fascist forces (Westwell 2004 ).
The German air force was organized into air fleets composed of several flying corps. The flying corps contained several wings (Geschwader), most of which comprised three groups each consisting, in turn, of three or four squadrons (Staffel). Each squadron had an authorized strength of twelve aircraft, but actual strength could be as many as sixteen or as few as four or five aircraft (Stedman and Chappell 2002) .
The German air force began the war in 1939 with 4,000 planes, including 1,200 fighters, and 880,000 men (Kroener et al. 1988) . It had initially been designed for joint arms operations; during the Blitzkrieg campaigns, it mostly operated as close air support for the army. The wars against Poland, France, and Russia opened with successful attacks on enemy air forces, destroying many planes on the ground. This tactic ensured that the Luftwaffe quickly achieved air superiority. The only exception before 1943 was defeat in the Battle of Britain. There, Germany's failure to dominate the skies ultimately led the planned invasion of the British Isles being called off.
By 1943, both personnel and the number of planes had approximately doubled (since 1939) to 2,000,000 men and some 7,000 planes (Kroener et al. 1988) . As the Allied bomber offensive against German cities gathered pace, ever more fighter units were called back to defend the Reich. Air attacks on hydrogenation plants and on airframe and aero-engine factories threatened the Luftwaffe especially, and from 1943 onward its efforts were devoted mainly to fending off the growing tide of bomber incursions.
Despite these efforts, German cities were quickly reduced to rubble as the strength of British and American air forces continued to increase.
Having started the war with modern planes and a large air fleet, Germany first lost its quantitative edge. Once it invaded Russia and US forces joined the fight, the Luftwaffe was heavily outnumbered in all theatres of war. It eventually fell behind also in terms of equipment quality; the outdated BF-109 remained Germany's main fighter plane until the war ended. New planes with advanced technology, such as the ME-262 jet, arrived too late to make a difference. Pilot training suffered in addition. Until 1942, German pilots received at least as much training as their Allied counterparts; but by 1944, a typical German pilot accumulated less than half the flying hours of UK and US pilots before being sent into combat (Murray 1996) .
Loss rates rose to staggering heights. During January 1942, the air force lost 1.8% of its fighter pilots; by May 1944, it was losing 25% of them every month (Evans 2009 (Murray 1996) . Nonetheless, due to the prolific output of German armament factories, the actual number of fighters in combat units rose until the end of 1944.
Air attacks against German cities may not have dented morale as much as British planners had hoped, and "precision" daylight bombing by the US air force destroyed much less industrial capacity than anticipated. Even so, the Anglo-American air offensive was clearly able to degrade substantially the German air force's capabilities -to the extent that the Normandy landings in the summer of 1944 were largely unopposed from the air (Neillands 2001 
B. Public recognition
A mention in the daily bulletin was among the highest forms of recognition given by the German armed forces. A typical report would describe only major events at the different fronts, listing gains and losses of territory or individual battles. Mentions were rare: during the entire war, fewer than 1,200 men were recognized in this way (Wegmann 1982 (Wegmann 1982) .
The Wehrmachtbericht was produced by the propaganda department within the operations staff of the German armed forces and under the direction of General Hasso von Wedel. Like all propaganda produced by the Third Reich, it skilfully mixed truth and distortions to create support for the war and the regime (Scherzer 2005) . Highlighting the superiority of German fighting men was an integral part of this strategy.
Mentions in the daily bulletin were part of an elaborate system of awards and medals operated by the German armed forces. Some were widely distributed, such as "campaign medals" handed out to every soldier who participated in a particular operation -one example is the Russia 1941 campaign medal, commonly known as the "Order of the Frozen Flesh". Some awards recognized particular skills or feats of arms, such as the close-combat badge and tank destruction badge. The primary medals for valor were the Iron Cross (1st and 2nd class) and the Knight's Cross. By the end of the war, four additional types of the Knight's Crosses had been introduced. During World War II, about 3.3 million Iron Crosses 2 nd class were awarded but only 7,300 Knight's Crosses, 890 Knight's Crosses with Oak Leaves, 160 with Swords, 27 with Diamonds, and one with Golden Oak Leaves.
C. Data
The high command of the German air force (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, OKL) received fighter claims throughout the war. A special staff for recognition and discipline was in charge of collecting and validating claimed aerial victories. Pilots were required to file extensive documentation before a claim was recognized. The OKL records contain information on every reported aerial victory of German fighter pilots during WWII by wing (Geschwader), unit (Gruppe), squadron (Staffel), and pilot's name and rank as well as by the day, location (grid reference), type of damage, witnesses, and type of the claimed aircraft.
German rules for counting a claim as an aerial victory were relatively demanding (Caldwell 2012) . Each claim had to be accompanied by a witness' report confirming either the destruction of the enemy plane (impact or explosion in the air) or that the enemy pilot was seen bailing out. Many claims were not accepted, and rightly so. There is some evidence of "over-claiming", by 50-100% in some cases, on the part of both the Western and German air forces (Caldwell 2012) , when the records of German and British squadrons are compared, for example. It was not unusual for claims to be investigated further before being finally accepted or disallowed. This has probably less to do with systematic dishonesty, and more with the highly volatile conditions of air combat itself (Galland 1993 We clean the Perry-Wood fighter claims records by correcting typos (e.g., misspelled names, incorrect rank or unit) and then construct a monthly panel by aggregating the information for every pilot by month and year. This panel contains the number of monthly victories per pilot together with pilots' first and last name, rank, wing, unit, and squadron. We then match the panel data with additional information from the Kracker Luftwaffe Archive. Kracker's archive consists of data collected from many sources of detailed personal data on German fighter pilots, such as their war status (e.g., killed in action, prisoner of war, WWII survivor) and for some pilots also the starting date of their Luftwaffe career. Thus for every pilot in the sample we have information on when he received an award, his war status, and how long he was active during WWII. Our first observation of a pilot is typically when his first OKL claim is filed; our database does not include pilots who never scored during combat.
Our analysis employs information based on day fighter pilots. This is because the tasks and skills required of night fighter pilots were substantially different. Whereas day fighters often battled against other fighter pilots, night fighters were mainly used to intercept bombers (Murray 1996) .
The sample is unbalanced and consists of more than 5,000 fighter pilots of the German Luftwaffe that made at least one combat claim during WWII. Pilots are observed for 19 months, on average, yielding a total of 96,127 observations. Of the 5,081 pilots in our data, 3,242 (or 64%) exit the sample -which means they are not in the next month's data set (provided the war has not yet ended). We count these exits as casualties. Spot checks suggest that the vast majority of cases so identified do indeed reference pilots who were either killed or severely wounded.
D. Pilot performance
The German air force in WWII counted among its ranks the highest-scoring aces of all time. During the war, 409 pilots scored 40 or more victories: 379 were from Germany, 10 from the Soviet Union, 7 from Japan, 6 from Finland, one from the United States, and one from the British Commonwealth. The best-scoring fighter pilot in history was Erich Hartmann, who had 352 aerial victories. The highestscoring non-German ace was Ilmari Juutilainen from Finland, with 94 victories; the best-performing Soviet, Commonwealth, and American pilots were credited with (respectively) 66, 40, and 38 kills. Figure 2 plots the distribution and nationality of WWII aces.
[insert Figure 2 about here]
The high concentration of aces in the German air force reflects three factors, of which the first was its "fly till you die" rule. While Western air forces rotated pilots out of active duty after a fixed number of sorties, German pilots continued to fly until they were shot down. 13 Second, the poor quality of planes and training in the USSR at the start of WWII gave German pilots great opportunities to rack up victory claims. Third, German pilots had much greater experience vis-à-vis enemy air forces during the conflict's early stages, a result of their participation in the Spanish Civil War (Bungay 2001 ).
Altogether, German air force records document 53,008 aerial victories. These are credited kills, not simply claims. In an average month, the average German pilot scored 0.55 victories and faced a 3.4% risk of exiting the sample permanently (which was practically synonymous with death). In the East (resp., West), the victory rate was 0.97 (0.32) and the exit rate 0.029 (0.037). In other words, the exchange ratio (the number of enemy planes shot down before a pilot was lost) was 33 in the East and 8.6 in the West.
14 The distribution of scores was extremely uneven. The top-scoring 110 pilots achieved as many aerial victories as the bottom 4,900 pilots combined. In an average month, the vast majority (more than 80%) of pilots failed to score even a single victory. At the same time, other pilots quickly notched up large numbers of victories: Emil Lang shot down 68 enemy planes in October 1943, and Hans-Joachim Marseille scored 17 victories in a single day (September 1, 1942) . Figure 3 graphs the number of monthly victories per pilot by the quantiles of the distribution.
[insert Figure 3 about here]
There was a large seasonal component to air combat. The summer season -when ground operations were common and hours of daylight were long -also saw substantial spikes in aerial activity; the winter months brought a lull in fighting. Figure 4 plots the mean victory and exit (death) rates over time. The time-series peaks mostly coincide, except for the end of the war when the victory rate plummeted and the exit rate spiked.
[insert Figure 4 about here]
E. Organization and training
The Luftwaffe was divided into air fleets (Luftflotten), each of which was responsible for a particular geographical area. The number of fleets rose from four to seven during World War II. Air corps within each air fleet controlled the planes and men; air "districts" were responsible for infrastructure.
The air corps consisted of wings (Geschwader) of approximately 100 planes each. The wings were organized by function, with different Geschwader for fighter planes, longrange bombers, dive bombers, reconnaissance, and so forth. Each wing contained several groups, all dedicated to the same specialized function.
There is no evidence that better graduate of the air combat schools were sent to elite squadrons. Allocation of new pilots to units was largely random, driven by operational needs, recent losses, and -sometimes -personal connections (Caldwell 1996) . Pilots were trained to fly before they received training in more specialized skills such as aerial combat. They would first attend "boot camp", which emphasized physical fitness and military discipline. After some basic training in aeronautics, they would then move on to an elementary flying school. Once they had their pilot's wings (after 100-150 hours), prospective fighter pilots were sent to air combat schools. Upon completing that course, the pilot would be attached to a squadron or group in an operational training unit at the front. The plan was for them to learn from experienced pilots before transferring to actual combat. Yet often -and especially as Germany's war situation worsened -training units were quickly sent into battle. By 1943, newly trained German airmen received markedly fewer training hours than their Western counterparts (Murray 1996) .
III. MAIN RESULTS: INDIRECT EFFECTS OF PEER RECOGNITION
In this section, we examine how recognition of outstanding performance influenced the monthly victory score of peers. We define peers as pilots who are of similar quality, who served together, or who hail from the same regions.
A. Results by pilot quality
We first examine whether a good pilot being recognized via mentioning in the Wehrmachtbericht changed the performance of other "good pilots" during the same month. For that purpose, we estimate the following equation (1) Here vici,t is the victory score of pilot i at time t, Mentionp is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if a Luftwaffe pilot is mentioned in the bulletin during month t (and set to 0 otherwise), Pi is the "performance bracket" to which a pilot belongs (i.e., bottom 80th percentile, 80th-90th percentile, 90th-95th percentile, 96th-99th percentile, topmost percentile), X' is a set of controls, and  is the variable of interest -namely, the term for the interaction between pilot quality and the period with a pilot mention. We control for pilot experience, aircraft type, front, and for the possibility that the month of mention was itself unusual. We are interested in the interaction  between the pilot quality percentile dummy Pi and the mention period dummy
Mentionp. If  is large and significant, then pilots in bracket Pi scored more during a month in which one of their fellow pilots was recognized (the mentioned pilot is excluded from the data.) Table 1 reports the results. We find that all highly-ranked pilots exhibit improved performance during periods when an ace is mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht dispatches. The additional outperformance -that is, beyond their outperformance due to inherent higher quality -is substantial. Note also that the relative increase in performance is greatest for the highest-ranked pilots. For example, those in the upper 1st percentile increase their score in months of mentions by about two thirds of their average whereas pilots in the 90th-95th percentile increase their scores by about a fifth of their average.
[insert Table 1 about here]
At the lower end of the skill distribution we find that pilots (a) perform better overall during periods when aces are mentioned but (b) underperform relative to higher ranked-pilots during mention periods. 15 In Section D, we document that the exit rate of low-ranked pilots increased sharply during periods when peers were mentioned. 15 To see this, note that the mention period effect is positive and also larger than the interaction effect. Average pilots perform less well than top pilots in average months, and that difference grows in months of mentions -with the net effect still positive.
B. Past peers
The definition of fellow pilots in Table 1 is based on performance tiers only. The key threat to identification is that the returns to being highly skilled (or extremely risk tolerant) may be strongly time-varying. Skilled pilots may all do well in a particular month, resulting in a high number of victories -with one pilot then being mentioned in the daily bulletin in the same month.
[insert Figure 5 about here] Figure 5 illustrates our identification strategy. Instead of calling everyone a peer who flies at the same time and then distinguishing them by their rank in the quality distribution, we focus on pilots who flew with the mentioned pilot in the past but have since been posted to another unit. Figure 5 presents Because we focus on past peers, our strategy has the advantage of being uncontaminated by correlated shocks (e.g., a major offensive, good weather) that could increase victory scores for everyone in the same unit. We estimate (2) where Pastpeeri, t is set to 1 if pilot i was a former peer of the pilot(s) mentioned at time t (and is set to 0 otherwise). For example, for Karl Gratz, Pastpeer equals unity for August 1943, when Günther Rall is mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht. PastpeerX' is a set of dummy variables -one for each eventually mentioned pilotindicating whether pilot i ever flew with a mentioned ace in the past. In the case of Rall, this variable equals unity for all pilots who had flown with him in different squadrons previously, even before August 1943. This allows us to control for pilots with peers potentially being of a higher average quality. In the aggregate, pilots who are peers of mentioned pilots do not perform notably better or worse than those who never flew with mentioned pilots (see Figure A5 in the Appendix). We again exclude pilots in the same squadron at the time of the mention. Table 2 shows first that past peers from the same squadron reacted strongly during periods when a former comrade is mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht. The variable's significance survives adding a large set of controls as well as squadron and time fixed effects (columns 2-4). 17 Using the most demanding specification, we check to see if pilots in the same group also exhibited a bump in performance. Recall that "groups" were larger units comprising three or four squadrons; they often (but not always) operated from the same airfield. We find outperformance also for former "group peers", but the effect is smaller. Finally, we form even broader comparison groups by tracking the location of every airfield from which German fighter units operated during World War II (Appendix figure A2) ; we then use this information to create a dummy variable for "base peers". Many such peers would have been in the same group, yet also other groups would sometimes have operated from the same airfield. We continue to find an effect but again it is smaller. As the intensity of (past) interaction declines, our regressions indicate progressively weaker effects from a mention in the daily bulletin.
Our initial analysis suggested that outperformance amongst former peer was heavily concentrated amongst the highest-performing aces. We now subdivide our sample into three groups -those below the 80 th percentile of victories, those above the 80 th , and alternatively, above the 90 th percentile. Table 3 reports the results. There is only a small and insignificant coefficient for former peer mentions for the bottom 80% of the sample -equivalent in size to about half of the Eastern front dummy. The top 20% of pilots show outperformance by 0.76 victories in the month a former peer gets mentioned; this is equivalent to a 70% boost relative to the baseline rate of scoring (on the Western front). For the top 10%, effects are even larger. The more demanding difference-in-difference specification for former peers thus confirms the results from Figure 1 -it is the top aces who react most strongly to another pilot being publicly recognized.
[insert Table 3 about here]
C. Birthplace peers
We interpret the effects of peer recognition as being driven by a desire to "keep up" with one's peers. In other words, the increase in the number of victories is compatible with an interpretation that emphasizes status competition.
To examine further whether such status competition could reasonably explain our findings, we test to see if those born in nearby towns react more strongly to a mention in the dispatches. We were able to determine the birthplaces of 352 aces. We already know that, among aces, the average score and the incremental effect of a peer mention is relatively large. But how much greater is the increase in the number of victories when a pilot from the same region is mentioned? While not every highperforming ace knew every other ace, many of them would have been familiar with each other's careers and background. In addition, last names often contain information about regional origins.
[insert Figure 6 about here] Figure 6 shows that, for pilots born close to each other, the effect of a mention in dispatches is especially large. 18 At a distance of less than 100 miles, the peer-induced boost during mention months amounts to more than 4 extra victories. Yet at a distance of (say) 400 miles, the performance bump amounts to only two additional victories.
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D. Risk
Fighter pilots faced high risks. Every aerial victory came at the risk of death. We do not have exact data on casualties, but we can construct a proxy based on exit from our sample. In those cases where it was possible to check (i.e., the subsample of 352 aces for whom we have additional information), the pilot was killed in almost every case. Any analysis of the Luftwaffe incentive system must consider both dimensions: the number of enemy fighters downed and the number of own men lost.
To examine these effects, we repeat the analysis from Tables 2, using risk of exit from the sample as our dependent variable. We employ survival analysis by performing Cox regressions on the data. Table 4 reports the hazard ratios for pilots conditional on the mention (in the Wehrmachtbericht) of a past squadron peer. Experience has only a limited effect on exit rates. On the Eastern Front, the death rates are clearly much lower.
[insert Table 4 about here]
For the sample as a whole, we find a markedly higher coefficient during periods with such mentions; in fact, the risk of exit is twice as high. This effect is even greater for pilots below the 80th percentile of average performance (column 2), with an increase 18 We use the simple specification from Table 2 , column 1 because our sample is small. 19 Overall levels are high because the small subset of 352 pilots with detailed biographical data is dominated by aces with very high overall performance. We also perform regression analysis to demonstrate the statistical strength of these findings. In Figure A .1 we plot the marginal effect of being a peer of a mentioned pilot in the month of the mention as a function of (the log of) birthplace distance, for four different specifications. In each case we obtain a clearly downward sloping pattern.
of 250%. According to the estimates with controls from Panel B, for pilots above the 80 th percentile, there is a 25% increase in the hazard rate. For the best pilots (those at the 90th percentile or higher), the effect is even smaller (+1.5%) and not significantly different from zero.
The findings summarized in Table 4 put the results on performance improvement in context. Even though performance increased for pilots on average in months when a former peer was mentioned, that increase came at the cost of higher exit rates. This effect differs by pilot ability. Those below the 80th percentile of scores earned 0.1 additional victories during months in which a former peer is mentioned (cf. Table 1 , col. 6); at the same time, their exit rate increased by a factor of more than 2. In contrast, top pilots (99th percentile or higher) earned 2.5 more victories during such months.
IV. ADDITIONAL RESULTS AND ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
We next attempt to rule out potential confounding mechanisms. In addition, we examine the robustness of our findings.
A. Correlated shocks
A natural confounding factor is the possibility of unobserved and correlated shocks simultaneously affecting the outcomes of different peer groups. To deal with the most likely correlated shocks, we focus on peers who are not part of the same squadron when measurements are made. This approach deals with contemporaneous, squadron-level shocks; however, we must still consider whether other omitted variables could be driving the results.
One direct way of addressing the risk of correlated shocks is to see if our findings hold when pilots from nearby units are excluded. For this purpose, we impose a minimum distance requirement for the airfields from which pilots' squadrons operated. During World War II, German forces were fighting from the Arctic Circle to the deserts of North Africa and from Stalingrad to the Spanish frontier with France. The minimum distance between air fields in our data is 9 miles; the maximum, 2,600 miles (see Figure A2 ).
Having imposed minimum distance requirements on our data, Figure 7 gives the coefficients on the former peer interaction variable as those requirements become increasingly stringent. A distance of even 100 miles usually corresponded to a marked change in combat conditions (for example, the northern and southern sectors in the battle of Kursk and Orel were approximately 100 miles apart). At a distance of 500 miles, units would be operating with different army groups (North, Center, or South) on the Eastern Front. Units flying bomber intercept missions over Germany were separated by up to 1,000 miles from their counterparts on the Eastern Front.
[insert Figure 7 about here] Figure 7 demonstrates that the coefficient for outperformance becomes greater as we impose increasingly stringent distance requirements. 20 This tendency holds for squadron peers, group peers, and (to a lesser extent) base peers. These results strongly suggest that our results are not driven by correlated shocks.
Another issue is possible confounding by differential but correlated upgrades in aircraft equipment. Since aerial combat performance depends not only on pilot ability but also on equipment quality, it follows that changes in performance could reflect changes in planes. Thus a sudden increase in the number of aerial victories could be driven by aces receiving nearly simultaneous upgrades in the planes they piloted.
However, that mechanism does a poor job of explaining our results. We have information on the type of aircraft used for 83,000 of our total 96,000 observations (see Figure A3 for the distribution of aircraft types used). Most missions were flown in one of just four aircraft types -the BF-109E, F, and G and the FW-190 -which together accounted for 86% of all aircraft types used.
Did correlated upgrades of equipment across former peers contribute to the increase in performance during mention months? This is unlikely. The Luftwaffe often upgraded entire squadrons to facilitate maintenance and training. Its usual procedure involved squadrons being recalled to Germany, re-equipped, and then sent back to the front. There is no anecdotal evidence of aces being given special treatment. To the contrary, at least one ace (Hans-Joachim Marseille) was forced to pilot an "upgraded" BF-109G -despite his protests -because his entire squadron was being re-equipped. Marseille died shortly thereafter when the more powerful but unreliable new engine failed on one of its first missions.
Furthermore, we directly control for the effect of aircraft type. The results reported in Tables 1-3 are from regressions that include dummy variables for the different types of aircraft. Any systematic increase in performance as a result of aircraft upgrades should be captured in our data. Finally, we check to ensure that the probability of flying a similar type of aircraft is not systematically higher in months during which an ace is mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht. This is not the case. 21
B. Social learning
One potential concern is a general co-movement of scores among pilots who belonged to the same squadron in the past. Suppose that pilots learned some specific skills from other pilots or in special circumstances in their area of operation while previously flying together, and assume that skill became especially useful in some later period. If outstanding pilots do so well that they are mentioned in the daily bulletin, then also other pilots with whom they trained -or who developed similar skills in the same environment -might likewise do better. In that event we would find higher performance by past peers in periods when aces are mentioned in the daily bulletin; yet the reason would be correlated on-the-job learning rather than motivation effects.
We do not believe that this mechanism, either, is likely to drive our findings. In the first place, our results in Table 2 already control for whether pilots ever served together in the past. This allows for general spillovers from the mentioned pilot to his former peer in all quiet periods, i.e. those without a mention. Also, note that fixed effects of having flown with an ace are not uniformly positive (see Figure A4 ): Some 44% of mentioned-pilot fixed effects are negative. There is no evidence that those who flew with later-mentioned pilots are themselves noticeably better pilots.
One remaining possibility is that, by flying together, pilots picked up skills that become useful in particular, novel situations. A pilot with a good enough month to be mentioned in dispatches may have had many former peers who could similarly exploit the skills jointly acquired in the past. Instead of estimating a level difference for pilots who are former peers, we allow for co-movement of victory scores of pilots in different squadrons if they flew together in the past, and ask whether this comovement strengthens during months when a former peer is mentioned. In this way, we allow the payoff from joint experience to be time-varying, as it should be if different combat conditions reward particular skills differentially.
To examine this question empirically, we first restrict the sample to former peersthat is, all pilots who flew at some earlier time with a pilot who is mentioned in a WWII daily bulletin. We then regress the log of victories by pilot i (+.01) on the log of victories of the mentioned pilot m (+.01), to allow for a direct estimation of the performance elasticities as follows:
In this expression, C is a constant, α measures the correlation of victory scores between pilot i and his dispatch-mentioned peer m,  is the average change in (log) victories in a mention month for pilot m, and  is the coefficient of interest -for the change in the co-movement between pilot i's victory score and that of his mentioned former peer. There is a high bar for validating this hypothesis: there must be an increase in the correlation during the mention period. Any pilot cited in the Wehrmachtbericht must by definition have had an exceptionally good month. So for his former peer to exhibit an even greater victory score correlation during mention periods would require a dramatic change in the latter's fortunes.
[insert Table 5 about here]
That is exactly what Table 5 reports. In non-mention periods, there is co-movement between the victory scores of former squadron peers. The correlation is 0.114; in mention periods it is 0.18, or more than 50% higher (column 1). This effect holds also when we control for front, experience, and aircraft type (column 2) as well as for time fixed effects (column 3). The results in column 3 indicate that the correlation during mention periods is stronger, by a factor of more than 2, than the correlation during quiet periods. After excluding pilots from the same group (because they might be subject to correlated shocks), we find a strong co-movement during mention periods but only a small and negative baseline correlation (column 4).
C. Learning about one's own ability versus status competition
Pilots who knew that their former peer had just been recognized may have updated their beliefs about their own skill and potential -and all the more so if they viewed the mentioned pilot as someone similar to themselves. These pilots might then exert more effort and/or take more risk, which would result in time-varying correlation in victory scores but not because of status concerns.
We consider this to be an unlikely account. We tackle the problem empirically by separating our data into two categories: mentions of a former peer whose monthly victory score exceeds the treated pilot's own past performance, and those that had never scored so much in a single month. For instance, when Rall is mentioned with a monthly score that far exceeds Gratz's, the latter may be learning about his own type. However, if in August 1943 (the month of Rall's Wehrmachtbericht mention) Gratz had already scored as much as Rall had, then it is more likely that status competition motivated Gratz to do better.
[insert Table 6 about here]
The results of this comparison are reported in Panel A (columns 1 and 2) of Table 6 . The spillover effect is strong in the group of pilots who had already performed at the same level, with large and significant coefficients at the squadron, group, or base level. Amongst pilots who had never performed at the same level, results are insignificant, and two of the three coefficients are even negative. This leads us to conclude that learning about one's own type is not the main channel for our results.
D. Placebo tests and Monte Carlo simulations
The statistical properties of our estimators certainly merit further attention. Both squadron membership and victory scores are observed with error, and our coding of the former affects the explanatory variable because we form peer groups based on who previously flew with whom.
We perform two exercises to address potential concerns. First, we generate "fake mentions" for pilots who satisfy performance criteria that are similar to pilots who are actually mentioned in dispatches. Our fake-mention dummy is set equal to 1 only for pilots who had more than 59 victories and had scored either (a) more than 11 victories in a single month or (b) a "round number" of victories (100, 150, 200, 250, 300) . We chose these cut-offs based on the average characteristics of mentioned pilots.
The results of this test, under the most rigorous specification, are reported in column 5 of Table 5 . The coefficient for placebo mentions is actually negative but insignificant. Table A2 (in the Appendix) gives results for all specifications. Although some of these are positive, none is significant. Importantly, once we exclude same group pilots (column 4), we find placebo effects that are very close to (and statistically indistinguishable from) zero.
We examine our estimation's statistical properties more broadly by performing some Monte Carlo exercises. We draw 0.01% of the observations randomly and designate them as placebo mentions. This procedure generates 93 instances, which is close to the actual number (84) of mentions. We use these faux mentions to code new peer variables and then run regressions of pilot performance against them (as in Table A1 , column 2). This simulation is repeated 100 times, and the results are plotted in Figure  A6 . The size of the coefficients are skewed slightly rightward. The actual coefficient estimated in Table A1 (column 2) is larger than the fake one in 92 out of 100 cases, and the former's t-statistic is greater than that in 97% of all simulated cases. In short: although our data may exhibit some upward bias, we find no evidence -either from placebo tests or our Monte Carlo simulations -of our results being driven by such a bias.
E. Type of mention
Mentions in the Wehrmachtbericht came in different types -mentions for high cumulative accomplishments, for achieving a round victory score (like 100, 150, 200, etc.), or for an unusually high score in a short time period like a day, a week, or a month. Only 15 mentions are for pure "flow" mentions, 55 are for "level" mentions (round or cumulative), and 13 combine both elements.
If high-performing aces were motivated by status competition, we would expect all of these types to have an effect. However, competing for a high cumulative score or a round number of victories will have less of an immediate effect in our data than to aim for a high rate of victory over a few days or weeks.
In Figure A7 , we plot outperformance results for each mention type. The coefficients are plotted for the specification from Table 2 column 4 including a full set of fixed effects. Flow mentions give the largest effect, but coefficients are not different from each other.
F. Results by front
Next we see whether results are similar for the Eastern Front and the Western Front. In Panel A of Table 6 , columns 3 and 4 report coefficients for the various categories of peer by front. There are positive coefficients in both theatres of combat operations for squadron and group peers, but those for the Western Front are uniformly lowerand not significant at conventional levels. For "past base" peers we find a negative results. Subdividing the sample reduces sample size, which inevitably leads to lower significance. If we simply use the estimated mean effects, effects in the West are somewhat smaller but not dramatically so. For squadron peers, background performance was 0.98 and 0.33 victories in the East and West, and outperformance in months of peer mentions 0.55 to 0.09, meaning that the boost was on the order of 55% in the East and 27% in the West. The smaller and insignificant result in the West probably also reflects differences in combat conditions. German air superiority was never re-established in the West after the Battle of Britain, but it prevailed for a long time in the East. That may have given high-performing pilots greater degrees of freedom to increase their score in the West.
G. Officers' versus other pilots' reaction
Status is a multifaceted concept. It is not clear ex ante if higher-status pilots should react more or less (than other pilots) to a former peer being recognized. In Panel B of Table 6 , columns 1 and 2 report results when our main analysis is replicated while grouping the sample into officers versus non-officers. 22 We find that officers in general show very similar performance increases when a former peer is mentioned in the daily bulletin. The difference in coefficients is 0.35 versus 0.3. For group peers, results also look very similar. Finally, we find that non-officers who shared a base with a mentioned pilot in the past seem to react more strongly, but coefficients are not statistically different from each other.
Officer status mainly reflected a difference in social background, education, and career choice. One possible interpretation is that spillovers were similar for officers and non-officers suggest a relatively egalitarian environment -amongst fighter pilots, status was predominantly defined by combat performance (Galland 1993) . 23
H. Stability by period
Next, we split the data set into observations before and after August 1942, when the war was approximately half over (month 35 of the 69 in our data). August 1942 is also close to the war's turning point.
In Panel B of Table 6 , columns 3 and 4 replicate our peer analysis for WWII's first and second half. During the first half, effects are smaller and less significant. One reason is that at first there are fewer observations of peers; as the war goes on, though, pilots accumulate more past peers and so our statistical tests become stronger. In fact, two thirds of our observations on peers of mentioned pilots are from the war's second half. We find that spillovers from peer recognition are more pronounced for the post-August 1942 period than for the full sample -a generalization that holds no matter which peer-group definition is used.
I. Lags and leads
It is crucial for our analysis that pilots do not react to their peers' performance before it actually occurs. Using lags and leads is a simple way to test the assumption of identical counterfactual trends for treatment and control pilots (Angrist and Pischke 2009) . To test for pre-event trends and effects, we align observations in event time, so t = 0 is the time of peer mention, and we drop all observations of pilots who were never the peer of a mentioned pilot.
[insert Figure 8 about here] Figure 8 plots average performance in event time. We distinguish between pilots above the 80 th percentile and all other pilots. As clearly shown in the left panel of Figure 8 , there is no positive trend among pilots prior to the mention of a peer. The same is true in periods after the peer's mention. Thus the only period that stands out is the one in which the mention occurs, where we see outperformance to the tune of 1.8 more victories per month by the best pilots. For pilots below the 80 th percentile, as expected given the results in Table 3 , we do not find a substantial jump in performance during the mention month relative to other months.
J. Effects by time since joint service
Our analysis is based on the assumption that pilots who served together in the past typically viewed themselves as peers. Such a bond should be relatively weak for those who flew together long ago; however, it should be stronger for those who recently shared the same officers' mess, commanding officer, and missions. To confirm that our hypothesized channel for differential outperformance is a viable one, we compare effect sizes as a function of how recently pilots served together.
[insert Table 7 about here]
In Table 7 we replicate the previous results for two subgroups: those pilots for whom more than the sample's median time (six months) had elapsed since joint service; and those for whom less time had elapsed. We find smaller effects for past squadron peers and past base peers who served together in the most distant past (but slightly larger effects for past group peers). Although the differences in magnitude are not significant, the results for squadron and base peers are in line with our hypothesis.
V. CONCLUSION
Social comparisons can demotivate employees, leading to lower job satisfaction and higher quit rates (Card et al. 2012) . There is also strong evidence that status competition is a potent force in human behavior, especially when it comes to consumption (Kuhn et al. 2011; Bertrand and Morse 2016) .
Our paper explores whether status competition can induce greater effort and more risk taking in a high-stakes setting. Using data from the German air force during World War II, we focus on pilots who flew together and were then assigned to different squadrons. When one of them is mentioned in the daily bulletin of the German armed forces for his outstanding accomplishments, former colleagues on average exert more effort and score more victories. The effect varies by skill group: performance gains are concentrated among highly skilled pilots; and though average pilots also score more, their gains are relatively small.
An important finding is that risk increased significantly for the low-skilled pilots: unlike high-skilled pilots, they die at a higher rate following the official recognition of a peer. Our findings suggest that status competition can be a key motivator for individuals in a high-risk setting with severe principal-agent problems. Yet highpowered incentives can backfire, possibly reducing efficiency in contexts where risk matters. 24 Table 2 , column 1. The analysis is based on data from 352 aces for whom birthplace location is available.
Figure 7: Peer Effects by Minimum Distance
Note: The figure plots the coefficient for outperformance (x-axes) during mention months -of the peers of mentioned pilots -as a function of minimum distance (y-axes) for squadron, group, and base peers. It uses the same specification as Table 2 , column 1. Note: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of the squadron ("Staffel"). Mentionperiod is a dummy variable that takes the value zero if no Luftwaffe fighter pilot is mentioned in the Wehrmachtsbericht during a month, and 1 otherwise. Pilots nth pcn is a dummy for whether a pilot belongs to the n th percentile (indicated by the column heading), capturing average outperformance by quality-percentile. We define pilot quality by ranking pilots based on their average monthly victory score during the entire conflict. Mentionperiod x Pilots nth pcn gives the outperformance of pilots in the n th percentile during periods when a Luftwaffe fighter pilot is mentioned. Eastern front is a dummy for pilots serving on the Russian front. Experience is the number of months of wartime service since the start of World War II, beginning with the first victory claim in our records (except for veterans of the Spanish Civil War, for whom we add months of service there after the first victory claim). In col. (1) - (4), we exclude higher-ranked pilots from the comparison group. Example: In col (2), for pilots in p95-99, we compare pilot performance for pilots in the 95 th to 99 th percentile with pilots in the 0 th to 94 th percentile, but exclude the top 1%. In the next column, we drop all pilots ranked 95 th to 100 th percentile. Mentionperiod is a dummy variable that takes the value zero if no Luftwaffe fighter pilot is mentioned in the Wehrmachtsbericht during a month, and 1 otherwise. Past squadron peer is a dummy for pilots who, in the past (but not at the moment of the mention), served with the mentioned pilot in the same squadron ("Staffel"). Past group peers are pilots who served in the same group ("Geschwader") in the past, but not at the time of mention. Past base peers are all pilots who served in units flying from the same airfield as the mentioned pilot at any point in the past (but not at the time of mention). All regressions include individual dummy variables (PastpeerX') indicating whether a pilot had flown with an eventually mentioned pilots in the past. Eastern front is a dummy for pilots serving on the Russian front. Experience is the number of months of wartime service since the start of World War II, beginning with the first victory claim in our records (except for veterans of the Spanish Civil War, for whom we add months of service there after the first victory claim). Note: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of the squadron ("Staffel"). Dummy variables for aircraft type are included from col (2) onwards. Log(vicmi+0.01) is the natural logarithm of pilot m's victory score (+.01), when m is a former peer of pilot i. Mention period is a dummy variable that takes the value one when a former peer is mentioned in the Wehrmachtbericht. In col (4), we only keep those observations for which pilots and their eventually mentioned squadron peer are not in the same group. Col (5) uses the same specification as the preceding column but is based on placebo mentions (cf. Appendix for details). Eastern front is a dummy for pilots serving on the Russian front. Experience is the number of months of wartime service since the start of World War II, beginning with the first victory claim in our records (except for veterans of the Spanish Civil War, for whom we add months of service there after the first victory claim). Note: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of the squadron ("Staffel"). Each entry in this table shows the coefficient of interest from a regression as specified in Table 2 , col. 4-6. Hence the first entry in column 1 here is the coefficient on past peer of mentioned, using the specification from Table 2 , col. 4, etc. For variable definitions cf. Note: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of the squadron ("Staffel"). Each entry in this table shows the coefficient of interest from a regression as specified in Table 2 , col. 4-6. Hence the first entry in column 1 here is the coefficient on past peer of mentioned, using the specification from Table 2 , col. 4-6. Column 2 repeats the same specifications but include pilot fixed effects instead of the PastpeerX' dummies. Column 3 includes individual dummies for each past squadron of pilots instead of normal squadron fixed effects, and column 4 includes the interaction of squadron and time fixed effects. For variable definitions cf. Note: The left panel of Figure A3 plots the number of man-months in our data set of different aircraft types (or combinations) flown by squadrons. The right panel plots the fixed effects for the main aircraft types in a regression using the specification of Table 2 , col. 4. .
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Figure A4: Fixed Effects of Pilots Who Are or Become Peers of Mentioned Pilots
Note: Each point represents the estimated fixed effects for pilots who become peers of a pilot who is eventually mentioned in the Wehrmachtsbericht (estimated for the sample as a whole). Note: The graph plots mean monthly victory scores for pilots who never flew with a mentioned pilot ("Neverpeers", solid curve) and for pilots who did fly with one at least once ("Everpeers", dashed curve). Note: * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of the squadron ("Staffel"). Columns 1-4 show all coefficients of interest from regressions as specified in Table 5 , columns 1-4. All results are based on placebo mentions instead of real mentions. 
